Architecture and deployment
A modular architecture for sovereign, isolated and federated training environments.
Scale the learning and control plane independently from range compute and high-volume telemetry while preserving clear authority, isolation and evidence boundaries.
CLIP · Public-safe reference layers
Illustrative view- 07Experience and access
- 06Learning, competency and exercise control
- 05Policy, identity and workflow
- 04Range and lab orchestration
- 03Isolated workloads and simulation
- 02Telemetry, evidence and analytics
- 01Operations, supply chain and assurance
Conceptual layers only. No deployable network detail is published.
Reference architecture
Seven layers with explicit responsibilities.
Layers are separated so that authority, blast radius and scaling behaviour are all explicit rather than emergent.
- 01Experience and accessPortal, workspace and remote-access termination.
- 02Learning, competency and exercise controlPathways, role profiles, scenario execution.
- 03Policy, identity and workflowAuthentication, authorization, approvals, target binding.
- 04Range and lab orchestrationTemplates, provisioning, isolation and lifecycle.
- 05Isolated workloads and simulationPer-exercise environments with default-deny egress.
- 06Telemetry, evidence and analyticsNormalisation, provenance, immutable artifacts, replay.
- 07Operations, supply chain and assuranceConfiguration, updates, SBOM and component risk.
Trust zones
Default-deny between zones.
Connectivity between management, learning, range, telemetry and evidence zones is denied unless explicitly authorized.
- AccessNo direct access to range workloads
- ManagementPrivileged, highly monitored and isolated
- LearningNo implicit trust into range or evidence zones
- Exercise controlController actions are authoritative and audited
- Standard rangePer-exercise isolation and default-deny egress
- High-risk rangeStronger isolation and an independent kill switch
- SOC / DFIRControlled access to exercise telemetry and evidence copies
- EvidenceAppend or controlled write; tightly restricted read and export
- Content supply chainUntrusted content cannot bypass validation
- External exchangeInspect, label and authorize every transfer
Deployment models
Five supported operating models.
Selecting a model changes isolation, update workflow and governance obligations — not the product's capabilities.
Fully disconnected operation for classified or otherwise isolated enclaves, updated through signed offline bundles.
Benefits
- No public-Internet dependency for learning, range or evidence functions
- Signed offline content and software update bundles with rollback metadata
- Local model inference for AI-supported training
Considerations
- Update cadence is governed by the offline transfer and quarantine process
- Internal mirrors are required for packages, images and models
- Time synchronisation must be provided inside the enclave for evidence quality
Reference scale profiles
Planning profiles, not capacity commitments.
These are starting points for infrastructure conversations. Final sizing must be validated by workload testing against your actual scenario topology.
| Profile | Intended use | Portal users | Active labs |
|---|---|---|---|
| P0 — Developer / PoC | Integration and demonstration | 20 | 10 |
| P1 — Institution | University, training centre or enterprise | 500 | 100 |
| P2 — Multi-institution | Government, defence or sector academy | 2,000 | 400 |
| P3 — Federated national | Multiple sovereign regional ranges | 5,000+ | 1,000+ |
Planning profiles only
Air-gap update lifecycle
Disconnected does not mean unmaintained.
Content and software reach a disconnected enclave through a signed, quarantined and reversible process.
- 01AcquireFrom an approved source.
- 02ValidateSchema, malware, licence and provenance.
- 03SignManifest and hashes recorded.
- 04TransferControlled offline movement.
- 05QuarantineNo use until validation completes.
- 06ReleaseApproved into the internal mirror.
In sequence: A bundle is acquired, validated against its manifest, signed, transferred into the enclave, quarantined until validation completes, released for use, and remains reversible through recorded rollback metadata.
Rollback metadata accompanies every bundle, so a release can be reversed without an external network dependency.
Interoperability
Open standards, backed by conformance tests.
Using a compatible file extension or endpoint name is not interoperability. Every claim below is intended to be demonstrated by a conformance test.
OpenID Connect / OAuth 2.x
BaselineIdentity
Authentication and federation with the approved identity provider.
LTI 1.3 / LTI Advantage
ConditionalLearning launch
Secure tool launch and result exchange where applicable.
xAPI / cmi5
ConditionalLearning activity
Detailed laboratory and simulation event profiles.
Open Badges 3.0
ConditionalCredentials
Verifiable completion and skill badges. Not regulated certification.
STIX 2.1 / TAXII 2.1
ConditionalThreat intelligence
Threat and exercise-content exchange for approved use cases.
MITRE ATT&CK / D3FEND / ATLAS
BaselineTechnique mapping
Scenario, detection and AI-threat mapping.
OpenTelemetry
BaselineObservability
Traces, metrics and context propagation across services.
SPDX / CycloneDX
BaselineSoftware bill of materials
Component transparency for distributed artifacts.
OpenAPI / AsyncAPI
BaselineInterfaces
Documented synchronous and asynchronous contracts.
Applicability is deployment-dependent
Architecture questions
Common evaluator questions.
Can the range run without any public-Internet access?
Yes. Core learning, range, evidence and reporting functions are designed to operate without public-Internet dependency, with updates delivered as signed offline bundles.
What happens to a running exercise if the central link fails?
Federated sites are designed to continue local exercise execution during an approved wide-area disconnection. Analytics and reporting may degrade; safety controls do not.
Does the application hold infrastructure administrator credentials?
No. Range lifecycle is reached through a narrow, least-privilege provider interface. The application never receives container-engine, cluster-admin or hypervisor credentials.
Can range compute scale separately from the control plane?
Yes — that separation is an architectural requirement, so a large exercise does not degrade portal or evidence services.
How is evidence protected from a compromised exercise workload?
The evidence zone accepts controlled writes only, and range workloads have no route to it. A compromise inside an exercise cannot alter sealed evidence.
Discuss your deployment.
Bring your isolation requirements, identity landscape and capacity expectations. We will work through the architecture against them.